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ica's withdrawal and to damage Reagan's electoral prospects.

In the case of Central America, Fidel Castro said in the course of a long private conversation with a recent Western visitor that "there is a great danger now that the U.S. will go into El Salvador to save a desperate military situation. It is easy to get in but harder than hell to get out." Nicaragua's Marxist strongman Tomas Borge claims that the morale of the government forces in El Salvador has crumbled to the point where a military victory by the FMLN guerrillas can no longer be discounted. At the same time, the Cubans and the Sandinistas were badly scared by the Grenada operation and continue to fear possible direct intervention by the United States in Nicaragua. Latest U.S. intelligence reports say that the Cuban presence in Nicaragua has been increased to 9,300. The overriding objective is to reduce the Reagan Administration to a choice between a power-sharing arrangement in El Salvador (intended to end, as in Laos, with an outright takeover by the Communist guerrillas) or a deepening involvement that will cost American lives and fuel an even more heated debate in the United States, where a formidable array of "expert" and left-liberal groups have been set up to assail the findings of the Kissinger Commission. Prominent in this constellation is Sol Linowitz, who is tipped as a possible Secretary of State in a Mondale administration. (A leading candidate to take the National Security Adviser's job if Mondale gets the presidency is David Aaron, who has extensive links with the far-left Institute for Policy Studies.) [E]

The KGB in Norway...

Arne Treholt was, at 41, a smooth, personable, and outwardly successful Norwegian government official—the head of the Foreign Ministry's Press Department—a former journalist who was married to a well-known TV presenter, when he was arrested last month on charges of spying for the Soviet KGB. He had been under observation by the Norwegian Security Service for years. After his assignment to New York as a member of his country's mission to the United Nations in 1979, he was kept under surveillance by the FBI at the request of the Norwegian service. He was observed attending clandestine meetings with identified Soviet intelligence officers in restaurants in Manhattan and Queens, as well as inside the UN headquarters on the East River.

According to reports from Oslo, his first contacts with the KGB date back to the 1960s, when he was a student activist on the left wing of the Norwegian Labor Party. He is said to have had an affair with a Czech girl (and to have had an illegitimate child by her), which may have marked him as an easy recruitment prospect and a candidate for blackmail. But he was also ideologically committed to the idea of a "nuclear-free Baltic zone"—the central theme of Soviet propaganda directed against Scandinavia. His Soviet contacts apparently encouraged him to use his political contacts to switch from journalism to a government job, and in 1973 he managed to get himself appointed counselor to the Minister of Fisheries and

Maritime Law, Jens Evensen. The post may sound colorless, but Norway and the Soviet Union were engaged in negotiations over the Barents Sea, and Treholt is believed to have been extremely useful to Moscow as an inside source. He was equally useful later on at the Foreign Ministry, where he had access to NATO documents and was able (while stationed in New York) to talent-spot other potential agents for the KGB.

He was arrested at Oslo's international airport, en route to deliver classified documents to his KGB contacts—and possibly to flee the country. But he had fallen under suspicion as early as 1977, following the arrest of a female Foreign Ministry clerk, Gunvor Galtung Haarvik. Norwegian security officials became aware that there was a continuing leakage of sensitive Foreign Ministry materials to the Soviets, and concluded that there must be a second, possibly more highly placed, agent in the Ministry. These suspicions were reported to the then Labor government, which refused to authorize a proper investigation.

One of Treholt's handlers was Gennadiy Fedorovich Titov, the KGB station chief, or *rezident*, in Oslo until the arrest of Gunvor Haarvik in January 1977, when he left the country in haste after two of his PR Line (political intelligence) officers, Aleksandr K. Printsipalov and Sergei Z. Gromov were declared *personae non grata*. Treholt flew to Helsinki and Vienna for meetings with Titov and other KGB officers after his return from New York to Norway in 1982.

Treholt's usefulness to the KGB extended beyond classical espionage to "active measures" and political influence operations, far beyond the borders of Norway. For example, he had personal access to Greece's Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, and Merlina Mercouri, now the Greek Minister of Culture, told an Oslo reporter after the arrest that she considered Treholt a personal friend, adding, "We all loved that man." This has particular significance in the light of the Papandreou government's unwillingness to curtail Soviet active measures operations in Greece. During his stint at the Norwegian Joint Staff College, Treholt visited military installations and received detailed briefings from high ranking military officers and diplomats in Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, West Germany, Britain, France and Belgium.

The "love trap," reportedly used in recruiting Treholt, has been the KGB's key to success in several other important espionage cases in Norway. Gunvor Haarvik, who spied for the Soviets for more than a quarter of a century, fell prey because of her infatuation with a young Russian she looked after as a nurse while he was being held as a German prisoner-of-war. A security guard at the Norwegian embassy in Moscow, Ole Martin Hoystad, also made himself vulnerable to the KGB when he fell in love with a Russian girl and decided to marry her. Through Hoystad, the KGB were able to gain access to the code room at the Norwegian embassy and inspect the equipment. In all these cases, the Soviets ensured that they had "hooked" their targets by inducing them to sign formal contracts with the KGB and receipts for payments in cash.

Despite the professionalism of Norway's Security Service—considered by intelligence experts to be one of the best in Europe—Oslo has long been a vital center for